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This chapter contends that there has been a significant shift in emphasis
in how the problem of poverty is conceived and addressed in Catalonia.
At the current time, a growing demonisation of people experiencing poverty
is evident, which sits alongside a general mood in favour of nationalism.
Support for both comes from neoliberal responses to financial pressures
exacted on the state. Although far from intertwined or an inevitable coupling
of interests, these dominant moods reflect the contemporary reality of
Catalonia. It is particularly noteworthy for Scotland, where welfare debates
have largely been seen as central to the independence debate, as it shows
that political self-determination is not intrinsically socially progressive.
After the end of the regime of dictator Francisco Franco, Catalan
society pursued a progressive goal of ending poverty. Dozens of campaigns
against poverty and in favour of labour, social services and affordable
housing established the socio-economic framework for a Catalan welfare
state.1 However, in the decade following 1996, Catalonia took a neoliberal
turn and, instead, pursued the enrichment of the few at the expense of the
majority. Although GDP rose by three points during the decade, the Gini
co-efficient rose in a similar proportion.2
More recently, this situation has worsened as the pursuit of neoliberal
goals that were initially merely unfavourable to people experiencing poverty
has been succeeded by social policies that are explicitly hostile towards
them. Fiscal pressure is used as an argument for the necessity of scaling
back on social protection expenditure, although, as it will be argued here,
the underlying motivations may be more ideological in nature. For exam-
ple, the ruling conservative party, the CiU (Convergència i Unió), has
stripped back the support that was available through the RMI programme
to those receiving less than €400 a month;3 indeed, Catalan Minister of
Enterprise and Employment (Conseller d’Empresa i Ocupació) Francesc
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Xavier Mena cancelled the RMI programme in 2012. Citing unproven con-
cerns over fraud in the administration of the scheme, this decision
adversely affected more than 7,000 of the very poorest Catalan families.4
More generally, conditions for the poorest people in Catalonia have
worsened markedly in recent years. Although fiscal pressures may partly
account for the difficulties faced, responsibility also rests with the Catalan
government, which has primary responsibility for public security (health,
housing, labour market and education). Since 2008, the population living
with poverty has increased dramatically.5 The Catalan Sindic de Greuges
(regional ombudsman) denounced the increase of child malnutrition in
Parliament.6 More than one-quarter of children live in poverty (there was a
child poverty risk rate of 26.4 per cent in 2011) – an increase of nearly nine
percentage points in just three years (from 17.6 per cent in 2008). In
response, the governing CiU said that the ombudsman was ‘alarmist’ and
prevented its health and education spokespeople from responding in
Parliament. 
Thus, the debate concerning the independence of Catalonia from
the Kingdom of Spain and the debate concerning the financial crisis have
been prominent on recent institutional political agendas in Spain, but have
not automatically been connected. Officially, from Catalonia, the process
towards statehood has begun, following several meetings between the
current government of Catalonia (Generalitat de Catalunya), the President
of Catalonia (Artur Mas) and the President of Spain (Mariano Rajoy). Since
the beginning of these meetings in February 2012, Rajoy refused to take
part in any negotiation because the Catalan government demanded exclu-
sive competences to collect taxes. Such arrangements have been made
elsewhere in Spain – for example, the special fiscal pact of Euskadi and
the Chartered Community of Navarre with Spain. Faced with this impasse
(no further negotiatations with Rajoy), Mas and his government declared
they are now pursuing independence.7
The political and economic context in which these events are occur-
ring is revealing. The ‘financial crisis’ has been used to justify the privati-
sation of large areas of the already diminished Iberian welfare state. So
while wealthy Catalans and Spanish continue to increase their profits
through privatisation (and, it might be argued, also from abuses of the tax
system), the Catalan government has become the first of the autonomous
communities to make cuts in public spending. Paradoxically, this disin-
vestment, which began in autumn 2011, came amid scandals of a very
different nature, especially the Palau de la Música case and other incidents
of white collar crime. A recent study stated that the intended savings from
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cuts in education and public health in Catalonia in 2011 were not sufficient
to counterbalance one-sixth of the fraud committed by those in power:
public disinvestment of €2.7 billion against the embezzlement of €16 bil-
lion by the state administration.8 While for the Catalan government tax
evasion of great fortunes is considered elusive, the cuts in social spending
are considered necessary, desirable and achievable.
The independence cause could have adopted (and could yet adopt)
a socially progressive response to the challenges faced. However, instead,
it has positioned itself – with almost universal public acceptance – as the
champion of new strategies for the punitive management of poverty, at the
heart of which is the demonisation of people experiencing poverty. These
strategies have been implemented in the US, have some support in the UK,
but are less common in continental Europe. Such punitive policy against the
poor, however, is camouflaged by a caring and patriotic veneer that functions
to allow a systematic assault against vulnerable sections of the population.
It might be argued that the punitive management of poverty has
been necessary in order for the powerful to divert attention away from the
socially regressive policies that are disadvantaging people experiencing
poverty (such as tax exemptions for heritage assets, the reduction in taxes
for the upper classes, inheritance and tax amnesties, as well as the fla-
grant cuts in health, education and subsidies9). Uniting against a common
cause (the errant and undeserving poor) is a repressive mechanism of
control through which rapid increases in social insecurity and public disor-
der can be managed. In this context, justificatory rhetoric from afar has
been imported into Europe – referred to by the sociologist Wacquant as
‘American penal judiciousness’.10 This provides an ideological and policy
framework that justifies the persecution and imprisonment of the poor. It
dismisses the social democratic concept of ‘rehabilitation’ as naive.
Solutions to the ‘problem of poverty’ are redefined within this frame-
work. The concern is not to improve the potential of the welfare state to
be socially progressive. Increasingly divisive groups among those experi-
encing poverty blame their situation on others who experience poverty
(rather than the socio-economic structures that work in the favour of the
most advantaged). For example, the problem of petty crime is addressed
by imposing strict regulations on street activities. Such restrictions have
increased exponentially and, as a result, virtually any informal work or
leisure practice on the street is problematised (including those through
which the poor may legitimately pursue income to ameliorate the intensity
of the poverty they experience). Increasingly, the problems associated with
poverty are left in the hands of charitable organisations.
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At the same time, a consensus is emerging regarding the delegiti-
mation – by law – of several kinds of inhabitants. This smacks of primor-
dial nationalism. In this sense, ‘immigrants’ are labelled by definition and
the varied assortment of people and practices as ‘uncivic’, and remain
excluded from the concept of the ‘ideal community citizen’.11 This con-
spires to maintain people in a permanent state of segregation in which a
full range of punitive measures can be systematically implemented. In
response to the demonisation of immigrants and concerns that are
expressed about their entitlement, social protection for all (immigrant and
non-immigrant alike) is threatened.
The management of poverty and criminality – through charitable
surveillance and the penal system – has become increasingly the domain
of powerful industries.12 The Spanish Catholic organisation Cáritas
Diocesana has an annual budget of €250 million and this continues to
increase.13 Although a planned privatisation of prisons is now uncertain
because of the ‘financial crisis’, the Interior Department of the Spanish
government is nevertheless trying to ‘improve the external control of pen-
itential institutions with private security’. Evictions continue while bank
bailouts are arranged, unemployment continues to rise, and insecurity and
decreasing wages are a daily reality for hundreds of thousands of
Catalans.14 This coincides with the penalisation of all disorderly conduct,
increased punishment, substitution of administrative faults for penalties,
and building new penal facilities or CIEs (immigration detention centres).15
The persecution of those involved in prostitution, pickpockets, street ven-
dors, drink vendors, buskers and other ‘undesirables’ (all considered in
equal terms) is considered a necessary part of the neoliberal management
of poverty. The undesirable elements in society may face the option of
accepting any employment under any conditions, ‘here or in Lapland’,16
and refusal to do so could result in a prison sentence.
Politically, the neoliberal solution is for the majority of a population
who are suffering the cuts to unite around a primordial nationalism, which
reproduces and complements the soothing effect of charitable rhetoric
and practices. The ‘true poor’ – as defined by our institutions – can count
on Christian ‘handouts’ and citizens’ charity: if they behave ‘correctly’ and
subscribe to the project of the ‘new state of Europe’. It will not be neces-
sary for them to go to prison; they will be able to live – certainly with some
difficulties – on the charity of ‘good citizens’. 
In 2012, the first year of the financial cuts, the Medal of Honour of
the Catalan Parliament (the highest honorary distinction of the Catalan
Parliament awarded to personalities and institutions who are creditors of
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exceptional recognition) was jointly awarded to the two ‘souls of the coun-
try’, Omnium Cultural and Càritas Diocesana. The former is a cultural
association focused on the protection of ‘language, culture and country’,
long associated with sustaining Catalan national identity in the Franco
years. The latter is an agency of the Catholic church, dedicated to the co-
ordination of beneficence. That these ‘two souls’ of Catalonia are claimed
to ‘symbolise that national and social aspirations are inseparable’17 is a
chilling triumph of neoliberal rhetoric and the defeat of solidarity in the
quest to tackle poverty in contemporary Catalonia.
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